

Los punteros más allá de las elecciones: Una nueva perspectiva a través del caso argentino

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Resumen

Desde 1950, las maquinarias políticas y los punteros han sido extensamente investigados dentro de la Ciencia Política; sin embargo aún está pendiente una descripción completa de sus roles. Este artículo contribuye con una descripción detallada de los muchos roles que los punteros desempeñan para sus partidos así como por qué lo hacen. En particular, demuestra que además de cumplir estrategias clientelares, los punteros llevan a cabo importantes funciones ejecutivas una vez que su partido está en el poder. La multiplicidad de tareas que los punteros desarrollan se debe a que tienen el conocimiento necesario de sus vecindarios para desarrollar exitosamente las actividades políticas a nivel local. Más aún, llevar adelante roles no clientelares los prepara para desarrollar estrategias clientelares. Este artículo presenta además una novedosa explicación teórica sobre los motivos por los cuales los votantes acatan el acuerdo clientelar. Basado en 120 entrevistas con punteros, se analiza el juego completo de las estrategias de los punteros así como sus relatos muestran el funcionamiento de la maquinaria clientelar.

Abstract

Party machines and brokers have been widely researched in political science since 1950, yet a full description of brokers' roles is still missing. This article contributes by describing in detail the many

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roles brokers perform for their parties and explaining why each broker performs all these roles. In particular, it shows that besides fulfilling clientelistic strategies, brokers perform important executive governability functions once their party is in power. Brokers multitask because they have the neighborhood knowledge required to successfully perform political activities at the local level. Moreover, performing nonclientelistic roles prepares brokers to perform clientelistic strategies. The article also presents a novel theoretical account for why voters abide by the clientelistic deal. Based on interviews with 120 brokers, it analyzes the complete set of brokers' strategies, and detailed narrative accounts show the clientelistic machine at work.

Introduction

In all humility, I come to present my candidacy for Governor of the Province of Buenos Aires. We have packed stadiums for them [the candidates for Governor] once, twice, three times in a row, and then we are left off the list and replaced by others who do not have a single broker" (Ishii 2011). In this statement, Mario Ishii, the three-time mayor of the municipality of José C. Paz, spells out what he considered his essential qualification to be nominated by the Peronist Party (Partido Justicialista, or PJ) as the 2011 candidate for governor of Buenos Aires Province: control of a large network of brokers.² Political machines around the world—that of Mayor Richard Daley in Chicago, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico, and the Nationalist Party (KMT) in Taiwan, for example—have all relied heavily on networks of brokers to compete in the political arena. This article explores the role of brokers in party machines through the case of the Peronist Party in Argentina. Even though the relevance of brokers for the PJ's extraordinary record of electoral success is well attested, no thorough explanation of brokers' complete set of roles has

² The Peronist Party is a working- and lower-class party founded by Juan D. Perón in 1947. With origins linked to the emergence of the working classes, it has been historically supported by the unions and consistently the largest party in Argentina. As a mass party organization weakly institutionalized, it has been largely considered a populist party (Levitsky 2003).

been published.³ This study contributes to the existing literature in three ways. It describes in detail the many roles brokers perform for their parties, it provides a theoretical explanation of why each broker performs all these roles instead of specializing, and it explains why voters abide by the clientelistic deal.

The literature has devoted a great deal of attention to brokers' clientelistic strategies, especially vote buying and rally mobilization.⁴ However, brokers perform a wide range of roles, not all of them clientelistic. Brokers do not win elections only by rallying and buying votes; they campaign just like other party activists, plastering posters, painting graffiti, and organizing party meetings. On election day brokers play a crucial role as party polling officials, and after the elections, they help their political bosses govern their respective municipalities by providing them with access to rough areas, operational skills, and information and by delivering public goods and services. Brokers are multitasking neighborhood operatives, helping their bosses not only to win elections but also to govern.

Beyond describing all the roles brokers perform for their parties, this article presents a theoretical explanation for why brokers multitask. Brokers have the neighborhood knowledge required to perform political activities at the local level that no one else can do, or do so efficiently. They are, in fact, repositories of neighborhood knowledge. Brokers work full-time to acquire their knowledge and place it at the service of politicians, and expect a salary in return. Once mayors hire these brokers, they exploit them for any activity that requires their knowledge and presence in the neighborhood. Investing in a local embedded network of brokers and then exploiting it to the

³ The PJ, since redemocratization in 1983, has won five out of seven presidential elections and has controlled most provincial and municipal executives.

⁴ Clientelism is the personal and discretionary allocation of goods and services to individuals in exchange for their political support. It is the discretionary and conditional manner in which goods and services are allocated that makes an exchange clientelistic rather than what is distributed. When the exchange is specifically for votes, then it is vote buying. For distinctions among clientelism, vote buying, and pork-barrel politics, see Schaffer 2007. For a general overview of clientelism, see Stokes 2007; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007.

maximum in every realm of grassroots politics is an optimal strategy for mayors and their challengers.

Furthermore, this study shows that performing nonclientelistic roles better prepares brokers to execute clientelistic strategies. Nonclientelistic activities consolidate brokers' positions in their local communities, which helps them to practice clientelism efficiently. By examining the whole set of brokers' roles and actions, this study presents a more nuanced image of brokers' clientelistic strategies. In fact, it provides a novel theoretical account for why voters abide by the clientelistic deal. It shows that brokers' multiple activities help them gain the information and reputation for delivering resources crucial for maintaining clients' loyalty. Brokers vary in their ability to obtain resources and fulfill promises, and voters prefer to support those with a reputation for delivering because they are a more reliable source of future rewards.

The PJ machine has its stronghold in the Conurbano Bonaerense (CB), 33 mainly poor municipalities surrounding the capital city of Buenos Aires, where mayors command large networks of brokers embedded in poor neighborhoods. The CB has a population of more than 10 million, accounting for 26 percent of the national electorate, concentrated in about 1.2 percent of the national territory. By any standard measure of poverty, this area shows poorer rates than the country as a whole.⁵ Given its large and mainly poor population, political control of the CB municipalities is crucial not only in electoral terms but also in terms of governability.⁵ The considerations about the PJ's electoral machine in this study are based on substantial observation of politics at ground level, as well as interviews with 120 brokers in 4 CB municipalities: Merlo, Malvinas Argentinas, La Matanza, and San Miguel (see the appendix for details).

⁵ For example, the rates for unemployment and underemployment are 15.2 percent at the national level and 19.2 percent for the Conurbano Bonaerense (INDEC 2011).

This article presents the main arguments about brokers' roles arising from the available literature, and then explains who brokers are and describes their networks. It traces brokers' executive roles in local government and in getting their candidates elected. It then offers a theoretical explanation for brokers' multitasking and a more practical explanation for voters' compliance.

A new perspective on brokers

Since redemocratization in 1983, the PJ has won 207 out of 247 elections (84 percent) for mayor in the CB, and today it governs 30 of the CB's 33 municipalities. Given that municipal candidates share the party ballot with provincial and national candidates, these results are also crucial for results at the provincial and national levels (Ollier 2010). In a seminal work, Levitsky (2003) shows that the network of brokers has been critical for this Peronist Party's electoral success, especially during the market reforms of the 1990s. In another persuasive paper, Calvo and Murillo (2013) prove with an innovative technique that the PJ has the largest network of brokers working to win elections in Argentina. Scholars have devoted much attention to this substantial network of brokers, making the PJ a particularly suitable case for analyzing what brokers do for their parties.

Scholars have studied different roles and actions fulfilled by networks of PJ brokers: vote or turnout buying (Stokes 2005; Nichter 2008; Weitz-Shapiro 2012), voter mobilization in primaries (De Luca et al. 2002, 2008, 2009; Levitsky 2003), and rally mobilization (Auyero 2001; Szwarcberg 2012), among others.

Brokers' multiple tasks help them to achieve the reputation that wins voters' support. Vote-buying deals involve voter commitment. After receiving a handout, voters could vote for a different candidate, reneging on their commitment to their brokers. So why don't they? Scholars offer two possible answers. Brusco et al. (2004) and many authors after them (e.g., Chandra 2007; Weitz-Shapiro 2012) argue that voters abide by clientelistic deals because brokers can monitor how individuals cast their votes, or at least, voters fear that they can. In contrast, Finan and Schechter (2012) and Lawson and Greene (2011) argue that clients' respect for reciprocity makes them fulfill their part of the deal; in this approach, voters feel an obligation toward the brokers who helped them out.

Neither position is fully convincing. On one hand, ballot secrecy is well established, so it seems unlikely that monitoring is the main mechanism sustaining voters' compliance. In fact, scholars who have done intensive fieldwork find little or no evidence of monitoring (Auyero 2001; Levitsky 2003; Oliveros 2012; Calvo and Murillo 2013). On the other hand, reciprocity arguments imply an asymmetry about actors' rationality: while politicians and brokers are self-interested and rational players, the voters apparently are altruistic or myopic. It is not clear why we should assume that poor voters are not strategic players, too. Reciprocity arguments also do not specify how many times clients are supposed to reciprocate after receiving goods from their brokers. In contrast with the previous literature, this study argues that voters prefer brokers with reputations for accessing and delivering resources. Once voters are convinced that their brokers are a reliable source of present and future goods, they support them indefinitely.

Brokers and their networks

Brokers (called *punteros* in Argentina) are neighborhood party agents who mediate between their bosses—politicians seeking voters' support—and poor people. They perform multiple tasks in poor neighborhoods, maximizing political support for their bosses. They are the mayors' and their challengers' workforces to gather support. Their power depends as much on their access to politicians who can grant them resources as on their personal ties to voters. As one broker declared, "90 percent of my problem is to keep connections in the municipality. If you have friends there, then doors will open when you knock. It is not easy; you need to be here in the streets of the neighborhood listening to people's needs, but also at the municipality getting resources" (Broker 1, 2009).

Most of the brokers interviewed (92 percent) live in the same poor neighborhoods where they carry on political activities. They usually have long experience in grassroots politics; their average age is 48, and their average length of service is 19 years. For poor people, they are not only their brokers but also their neighbors, whom they have usually known for many years. This explains why brokers have detailed information about their neighborhood and clients' needs. Of the brokers interviewed, 46 (38 percent) were women. On average, each broker helps 85 people on a regular basis. Most brokers are also community leaders. About a quarter of them were already doing social work when they were recruited as brokers by the PJ. Their involvement in soup kitchens, welfare programs, soccer clubs, or health care centers meant that they were familiar with the poor and their needs—an essential quality to become a successful broker.

Brokers work within a pyramidal and hierarchical structure. They are at the base of this structure, reaching poor households in nearly every corner of their municipalities. At the apex are the mayor and an inner circle of two or three people who help build and control the network; these usually include the municipal secretary of government and secretary of social development. Beneath them is a group of municipal delegates or council members who deal directly with the brokers. Mayors' challengers run alternative networks of brokers, also with pyramidal structures. These compete with the incumbent mayor's network for supporters—although usually with substantially fewer resources.

Whereas political activists (known in Argentina as *militantes*) freely promote their party out of conviction, brokers conduct their political work for compensation, whether it be a salary or material benefits. Of the interviewed brokers, 72 percent (81) had a temporary municipal job or a workfare program. As one mayor told me, “granting temporary public jobs is the way we have to pay our brokers” (Mayor 1, 2009). Brokers receive a temporary job or a workfare program for

themselves but also receive other positions to distribute among followers. In fact, among all the resources brokers distribute, public jobs and workfares are the most valuable ones for building a group of supporters.⁶ Fifty-nine percent (62) of the brokers interviewed allocated temporary public jobs or workfare programs (question 1. Interview questions appear in the appendix).

Brokers make an income not only from their salaries but also from taking a share of what they distribute to their followers. In contrast to activists, brokers commonly distribute goods clientelistically and take a cut for themselves. In the interviews, brokers regularly accused other brokers of siphoning off resources for themselves or their families. Even though it is illegal, eight brokers admitted to keeping 10 percent of the monthly salaries of the people to whom they gave workfares. One of them said, “We all do the same. Do not believe them if they tell you otherwise. I only ask for 10 percent but some ask for 50 percent of the salary” (Broker 2, 2010). Since August 2009, the most important workfare program in terms of number of beneficiaries has been the Social Income Working Program, Argentina Works, often just called Argentina Works (Argentina Trabaja: Programa de Ingreso Social con Trabajo). Beneficiaries have to work for the municipality to receive their salaries. Because brokers often keep 50 percent of beneficiaries’ salaries to excuse them from work, the program Argentina Works is nicknamed in poor neighborhoods Argentina Rests.

Besides working for the municipality, most beneficiaries are expected to participate in campaigns, turn out at rallies, and vote for the broker’s boss. Voting with the broker is one dimension of the support brokers expect from beneficiaries. Temporary municipal jobs and workfare programs are ideally suited for clientelistic deals. Beneficiaries receive an average monthly salary of about US\$300, which is extremely valuable in a context of poverty and high unemployment. Brokers

⁶ On the relationship between patronage and electoral support, see Calvo and Murillo 2004; Kemahlioglu 2012. For a full account of the political services provided by public employees, see Oliveros 2012.

control access to and continuation of this income. Temporary municipal jobs and workfare programs provide mayors and politicians with a cheap labor force commanded by brokers. A broker explained that “people working in the cooperatives should stand by the mayor’s team; if not, we send them back home” (Broker 3, 2010).

Governing

Brokers’ support also includes activities that help mayors govern their municipalities. The current literature fails to recognize that brokers’ tasks are not limited to accessing power; they also include the exercise of power.⁷ As part of the mayors’ governing structure, brokers receive a salary and take part in executive matters that affect their neighborhoods. Brokers help govern a municipality and deliver services on a day-to-day basis, not just during elections. A municipal subsecretary of government explains this role as follows: “they [brokers] put us, the government, in touch with reality. They are the ones who know how we are [doing] with the people. We make the decisions, but they make those decisions work in reality” (Oscar 2010). By performing this role, brokers not only gain electoral support but also consolidate their positions in their local community, which helps them practice clientelism efficiently.

Brokers invest considerable time in attempting to provide public goods and services for their neighborhoods. Brokers frequently solve neighborhoodwide problems by providing small-scale public goods, such as street lighting in dark areas, bus shelters, and garbage trucks. While this might be considered pork-barrel politics, it is not clientelistic because it does not have a discretionary component based on individual political behavior. Sixty-four percent (63) of the brokers interviewed supplied some public goods to their neighbors, and 76 percent (74) regularly

⁷ For a distinction between access to power and exercise of power, see Mazzuca 2010.

provided services—such as organized sports and fieldtrips for children, school tutoring, legal counseling, and job training—without distinguishing among beneficiaries as to their political leanings (question 2). A common service brokers provide is organizing social gatherings and parties for the neighborhood. For example, brokers frequently mentioned that they were involved in organizing parties for Children’s Day, Independence Day, or Christmas.

The immediate question that arises is why brokers provide small public goods and services when they cannot discriminate among beneficiaries. According to the literature, brokers should be devoting all their resources to practicing clientelism in order to secure political support. In fact, mayors resort to brokers to distribute public goods, and more generally to govern, because brokers are mayors’ facilitators in poor neighborhoods, bringing them access to rough areas, information about the neighborhood, and operational expertise.

If brokers, as usually highlighted, facilitate poor people’s access to the state, it is equally true that brokers enable the state to reach poor populations. Brokers bridge the gap between municipal government and poor people by bringing the former to the latter. Poor areas are usually cut off from state help by transportation issues, crime, and cultural differences; in these areas, brokers give their bosses a grassroots presence. In this sense, brokers represent a discretionary and particularistic presence of the state in poor areas, as opposed to its complete absence. A broker in a slum introduced himself as the “mini-mayor” for his neighborhood (Broker 4, 2010). Brokers also provide security in rough areas. For example, they help municipal employees enter dangerous areas to perform jobs. Otherwise these employees could be robbed and their equipment or machinery stolen. One mayor even admitted, “There are about 20 slums in my municipality; it would be impossible for me to enter to any of those without my brokers” (Mayor 3, 2010).

Brokers also provide their bosses with information. Brokers come from and live in the neighborhoods where they are politically active. They are in permanent touch with neighbors, and have detailed knowledge of their needs and possible solutions, about which they inform their bosses. Ninety-three percent (104) of the brokers said they knew the socioeconomic situation of each family they helped (question 3). In the view of one mayor, “brokers are much more useful in terms of governing than in terms of elections. They are key providers of information. They tell you the needs and what is going on at the neighborhood level” (Mayor 2, 2009). Brokers also collect information about political opportunities and threats, upcoming protests, and opponents’ activities. Brokers regularly reported that part of their job was to keep their political bosses informed of what was going on in politics at ground level.

As community leaders, brokers usually have operational expertise in organizing people. This helps them run municipal community centers, health care centers, sports centers, and delegations in poor neighborhoods. Formally or informally, brokers also coordinate the Argentina Works cooperatives, which do mainly community jobs, such as cleaning streets and parks and building sidewalks and bus stops. As coordinators of these cooperatives, brokers usually decide which work has priority and how it is going to be completed. Brokers also fill other positions in the municipality, especially in social and infrastructure sectors, to which they bring their expertise.

As community leaders, brokers can also be crucial in preventing or causing social unrest. In April 1989 and December 2001, when hyperinflation and shortages left poor people without food, riots and looting broke out in several areas of the CB. Many brokers—following their bosses’ orders—encouraged this looting and rioting (Auyero 2007). Conversely, brokers often fix problems in municipalities where mayors want to prevent social unrest. For example, most brokers

interviewed mentioned that when times were hard, they organized soup kitchens in their neighborhoods.

Even those brokers who work for challengers to the mayors are responsible for keeping their bosses informed and granting them access to poor areas. Mayors resort to brokers for governing, particularly for providing public goods, because they are helpful and also because this empowers brokers to carry out clientelistic strategies. The provision of public goods brings direct support not only for mayors but also for brokers. A poor resident of a shantytown in La Matanza illustrated this: “Carlos got us the water pipelines; they said he is a puntero, but what I know is that all of us have water thanks to him. I will always support him. He is good for the neighborhood, even if he is a broker” (Luis 2009).

As brokers help their mayors by repeatedly providing small-scale public goods and services, they also extend their influence in three important ways that are functional to their clientelistic deals. First, they build a reputation for having access to resources and delivering them. They fill the gap between state provisions and people’s needs by getting services and small-scale public goods for their neighborhoods. By providing everything from pavement materials to sewage pipes, brokers develop a reputation for accessing resources and delivering to poor people. This double reputation is crucial for clientelistic deals. Voters support brokers who enjoy a reputation not only for accessing resources but also for keeping their promises.

Brokers also need a thorough knowledge of their neighborhoods, the people, and their problems to practice clientelism efficiently (Zarazaga 2014). Vote buying in particular requires knowing how much it takes to secure the vote of a particular resident. Supplying public goods and organizing social events connect brokers with poor people’s needs. Their connections to the municipality help

them to consolidate a position in their neighborhood from which they can screen people and find out their needs, political preferences, and willingness to participate.

By providing public goods throughout the year, brokers legitimate their roles and develop an environment in which to practice clientelism with less liability. Scholars believe that only the middle and upper classes despise clientelism (Weitz- Shapiro 2012), but in fact most people in the poor neighborhoods of the CB also criticize it. One PJ broker said, “You have to help the poor but be careful not to make it look like clientelism. Nobody likes being used” (Broker 4, 2010). Brokers are aware of the harsh criticism directed at clientelism, and try to present themselves as people concerned with social issues and neighborhood problems rather than electoral matters. It is interesting that while the media and scholars call the brokers *punteros*, the brokers call themselves *referentes barriales* (neighborhood representatives). This is because the *punteros* label is immediately associated with clientelism.

Getting candidates elected

Thus brokers perform important executive functions to guarantee governability, but they also are paid to improve their bosses’ chances of being elected. Growing poverty has led to a steady increase in materialistic voting. However, not all the strategies that brokers use to win votes are clientelistic. Brokers also campaign in traditional ways.

Brokers as Propaganda Activists

Scholars and the media have underestimated the most common way brokers have of winning votes: by campaigning. One of the main goals of all brokers is to promote their political bosses.

Given the price of airtime on national television and the low readership of newspapers in poor areas, mayors and their challengers rely mainly on local campaigns run by brokers, who form the PJ campaign army. A broker's ability as a propaganda agent makes his or her candidate's name known, but it also proves that the broker controls the territory. Brokers who are successful at campaigning receive more resources, which in turn allow them to practice clientelism and recruit more followers. By campaigning, brokers signal to their neighbors that they are connected to politicians, and therefore have access to resources.

Brokers run local campaigns from their homes or from party offices they open for the occasion. At election time, an army of brokers and their aides campaign door to door, put up posters, and paint walls with candidates' names. In poor neighborhoods, Peronist brokers constantly visit voters' homes, leaving ballots and inviting them to neighborhood gatherings to meet the candidates. This traditional—and nonclientelistic—way of campaigning, which makes the PJ the most visible party in the CB, puts a heavy workload on brokers. During the 2009 election, 64 percent (72) said they organized neighborhood meetings so that voters could meet the candidates and know their ideas (question 4). By bringing their candidates to meet people in their neighborhoods, brokers show their bosses their convening power and signal to voters once again that they have access to goods and services.

Much advertising for candidates consists of graffiti and posters on empty walls. For candidates, these are crucial means to make their names well known among the neighbors. As a broker declared, “good governance or clientelism is not enough to win an election; candidates need voters to have their names in their minds” (Broker 2, 2010).

However, brokers' efficiency as campaign agents also enhances their opportunities to practice clientelism. Before allocating or withholding resources, political bosses check how many people

brokers have brought to political meetings and how many streets they have covered with candidates' names. Brokers also reported that candidates evaluated them on the length of time their posters and graffiti were visible.

Brokers need to be efficient campaign agents and show control of their territory to access more resources. Consequently, traditional campaigning can be dangerous. When brokers support different Peronist candidates, competition for walls, signposts, and other spaces often involves violent fights between rival groups, especially when one group tries to obliterate or remove rival propaganda. Control of the territory is at stake and, therefore, brokers' access to resources. Twenty brokers told me they had been involved in shootouts with competing brokers while painting graffiti and hanging posters at night.

A Peronist candidate for the local legislature of San Miguel said that his faction paid a broker US\$5,000 to paint graffiti after receiving guarantees that nobody would paint over them. The broker patrols the streets each night with an armed gang of followers, even signing his graffiti with his nickname to warn off other brokers. A former governor of Buenos Aires confessed that "during the campaign you are obsessed with having brokers keep painting graffiti to a point where you do not care if they are involved in drugs, fights, or illegal issues. You just want them to paint, and you give them resources to do it" (Governor 1, 2010).

Brokers as Rally Mobilizers

The other campaign activity for which brokers are crucial is rallies (Auyero 2001; Szwarcberg 2012). Filling rallies is an essential part of the broker's job because rallies allow candidates to display their power of mobilization to their party bosses and the general public. They also give

mayors and their challengers a way to measure and reward brokers' convening power. The number of buses brokers can fill is one of the main factors that determine the amount of resources they will get from their bosses (Szwarcberg 2012).

Brokers use clientelistic strategies to mobilize all their followers for rallies. One of their main resources for filling buses is the workfare program Argentina Works. Besides working for the municipality, most beneficiaries are expected to participate in rallies. As program coordinators, brokers are in charge of enrolling people in the program and checking that they fulfill their responsibilities. This turns brokers into powerful gatekeepers. They often use this power to demand people to rally, threatening beneficiaries who refuse with removal from the program. One broker said, "I think it is okay that we demand that people working in the cooperatives rally for us. The name 'cooperative' itself indicates its goal: I cooperate with them; they have to cooperate with me" (Broker 5, 2010). Another broker commented on a "betrayal" by two people to whom he had given municipal jobs: "They didn't come to rally for me. Now they will see. I will cut off their oxygen [meaning their jobs]" (Broker 6, 2010). Municipal temporary employees are also expected to turn out at rallies; otherwise the threat of losing their jobs always looms large. On rally day, candidates check whether brokers have bused in the promised number of supporters or whether they are just "selling smoke" (*vende humo*, bluffing). Each broker mobilizes an average of two busloads of supporters with 30 to 50 people per bus.

Candidates use rallies not only to campaign and display their power but also to count the number of supporters each broker provides. Even when candidates know that some of these supporters might not vote for them, they use these numbers as proxies for the number of votes that a broker might deliver and reward the broker accordingly with resources.

Like graffiti writing, rallying is often accompanied by violence. Candidates want the president of Argentina's support to run for mayor, which means they need the president to see that large groups follow them. So when the president visits a municipality, especially municipalities with intraparty competition, every PJ candidate mobilizes constituents, who fight for the most visible spots. A Peronist opposition broker from Malvinas Argentinas said, "The last time President Cristina [Fernández de Kirchner] was here, we went with our group, but the mayor's brokers forced our people to fold up our banners so that Cristina could not see how many we were" (Broker 7, 2009).

Consequently, candidates usually require some of their brokers to mobilize la pesada—thugs who fight other factions if things get violent. La pesada is usually in charge of playing drums, carrying big banners, and fighting for visible spots during rallies. In the interviews, 15 brokers mentioned recruiting local soccer hooligans for the pesada. When asked, 85 percent (85) of the brokers answered that the practice of paying with illegal drugs was used extensively (question 5). Twelve brokers actually admitted to having paid people with drugs. "When you need to mobilize 'people with drums' for rallies, it is with joints and alcohol. If not, they stay at home" (Broker 2, 2010). It is difficult in these settings to run a campaign without an army of brokers. While politicians need brokers to campaign in traditional ways—visiting people's houses, distributing ballots, and painting graffiti—they also need them to defend their campaigns in less conventional ways that imply violence and illegal activities.

Brokers as Vote Buyers

Every broker interviewed practices vote buying, and they generally recognize that without resources they would sooner or later lose their followers. Brokers' narratives show ground-level

politics becoming increasingly commodified since the 1990s. A broker illustrates the process that turns neighborhood party leaders into rented political mediators.

We went from being activists and social advocates to just rent brokers. Now nobody cares about the [Peronist] doctrine anymore; it is all about the material rewards that you can get. It is the same for the politician, the broker, and the voter. We all ask how much is on the table for us. (Broker 8, 2010)

Levitsky's groundbreaking fieldwork (2003) offers a basis for comparison that confirms this process. In 1996–97, Levitsky interviewed 112 brokers, 60 percent (67) of whom regularly delivered particularistic favors. Fifteen years later, my own subsample of Peronist brokers was exactly the same size and coincidentally taken from a very similar context. Yet I found that every broker regularly delivered particularistic favors. This development points to a process of commercialization of politics at the ground level.

Whereas most brokers did not initially admit to using material incentives to get votes, all of them immediately accused the other brokers of doing so. Surprisingly, 48 brokers admitted at some point in the interview that they did, too. Usually the admissions occurred when I asked brokers how their political bosses would react if they did not allocate resources strategically. One broker who worked for a challenger candidate criticized his rival PJ broker in the following way: El Cacique got food from the mayor two weeks ago. He used that to buy votes. He goes to a family, and says to them: "Here you have food, and I will give you handouts every week." And, well, then this family, which probably has many members, will vote as El Cacique says because they need the food. (Broker 9, 2009)

Immediately, this broker claimed to be different: "I just give the food, when I have it, to those who really need it, without looking at their color or their party. I do not care how they will vote." Asked

whether his political boss would not complain about such open-handedness, he answered, “Well, of course, I am not stupid, I know I need to deliver votes; I give the food to the poor people who will vote for my candidate. I need to sustain my share of votes. But they certainly need this help” (Broker 9, 2009). Suddenly, the difference between El Cacique and his competitor vanishes in the same narrative. Brokers are ideally placed to buy votes effectively. They are in the poor areas, and have the resources and the information to do so efficiently. Let us analyze these two brokers’ assets.

Brokers usually receive a variety of resources from candidates and their allies to buy votes. Resources named by brokers in the interviews included jobs, workfare programs, food, medicine, clothes, shoes, coffins, school materials, appliances, bricks, zinc sheets, cash, marijuana and other illegal drugs, and many others. As noted, the most valuable of these resources for both brokers and voters are public employment and workfare programs. While the political support expected from people who get jobs or workfare programs goes beyond votes, votes are nonetheless crucial. Therefore, jobs in the municipality or in cooperatives are usually allocated to people who will bring in many votes; for example, parents of large families (Zarazaga and Ronconi 2012).

Table 1 allows us speculate about the possible impact on municipal elections of temporary municipal jobs (TMJs) and Argentina Works cooperatives (CPs). It includes in column 1 the number of people with TMJs and in column 2 the number of people in CP in four CB municipalities. The Municipal Employees’ Union estimates that there are actually twice as many TMJs, but I have used the most conservative figures to show that the potential impact of these resources is important even using unadventurous estimates.⁸ Column 3 gives the estimated total number of people

⁸ Data provided by FESIMUBO (Federación Sindicatos Municipales Bonaerense), September 9, 2009, personal communication.

legally allowed to vote in families that receive a TMJ or a CP.⁹ Column 4 shows the total positive votes for the mayoral election in 2011, and column 5 shows the total number of votes that the elected mayor received in these municipalities in the 2011 election.

Table 1

Table 1 suggests in approximate terms the impact of TMJs and CPs on municipal electoral results. People who receive TMJs and CPs are poor. Usually, both they and their families depend on the income these jobs provide. Since beneficiaries need their brokers to do well in elections in order not to lose this income, we can speculate about the number of votes that are affected by the allocation of TMJs and CPs. Using columns 3, 4 and 5, it can be established that in these municipalities TMJs and CPs could affect between 8 and 12 percent of the total positive vote and between 14 and 21 percent of the votes for the elected mayors. While TMJs and CPs could not by themselves win elections, they could potentially provide a decisive base of votes.

In 2011, President Cristina Kirchner's landslide victory also meant comfortable victories for all her mayors. In 2007, however, the elections showed closer results. In San Miguel and Malvinas Argentinas, for example, the number of voters in beneficiary families was larger than the difference in votes between the winner and the runner-up for the mayoral election. This indicates that TMJs and CPs managed by brokers could potentially decide between winning and losing an election. Obviously, no direct inference can be made from table 1, as we do not know how people that received jobs and their families actually voted. However, while we should be careful when making inferences from table 1, the figures do help to illustrate the potential electoral impact of discretionally distributing temporary public jobs and workfare programs.

⁹ According to the EPH (Fourth Semester 2011 – INDEC), families that receive a workfare program have an average of 3.1 members who are legally entitled to vote. Column 3 results from multiplying by 3 the number of beneficiaries of TMJ and CPs.

Food handouts and medical supplies come next in importance after municipal jobs and positions in cooperatives. Eighty-six percent (69) of the PJ brokers distribute at least one of these on a regular basis. Another important item is building materials, especially zinc sheets and bricks (question 6). Brokers also provide transportation on election days to ensure that resource recipients turn out to vote. During the

2009 election, brokers in San Miguel hired everyone in the area who had a car. They gave them US\$15 and coupons for gas to drive people to the polls. A broker who assists a group of 80 people stated, "Whether you win the district depends on whether you are able to make the people you had helped all year show up" (Broker 10, 2010). Even though brokers invest in mobilizing their own followers (Nichter 2008), they use this as a complementary rather than an alternative strategy to vote buying in order to harvest every single vote in which they have invested.

The evidence suggests that brokers devote significant resources to vote buying. Rather than randomly allocating these resources, brokers distribute them according to the information they possess in order to secure the largest number of votes at the lowest possible price (Zarazaga 2014). As on-the-ground actors, brokers control their territories; they know the people and their problems. Brokers told me at some point in the interviews that being close to the voters, knowing their problems, and being available 24 hours a day were crucial components of their job (question 7).

Brokers are poor people's neighbors. A broker told me, I know their situation every minute. When Matilde, the old lady across the street, passed away, nobody told me but I knew they did not have money for the coffin so I showed up with it. When spring comes, I know that the mother of the asthmatic boy from two blocks down cannot afford the medication so I got it for her from the mayor. Nobody could ever help them like me. (Broker 3, 2010)

Personal and direct ties with their constituencies allow brokers to distribute highly specific benefits with near-perfect timing, including primary goods such as coffins, medicines, food, and other discretionary rewards. No party except the PJ has a network of brokers so deeply immersed at ground level, and consequently, only the PJ has the local knowledge to allocate resources efficiently (Zarazaga 2014).

However, brokers' command of information and resources does not necessarily guarantee that clients will fulfill their part of the deal. As a broker explained, ensuring voters' compliance is always a challenge: "You never know. You always have some people who get handouts from you and they ask you for a ballot, but then in the booth they stab you in the back" (Broker 11, 2009). In other words, voters may receive handouts but then vote as they wish.

Brokers as Party Polling Officials

Whether in primaries or general elections, brokers are crucial on election day. At each polling station, the broker plays the role of fiscal de mesa (party polling official). Brokers arrive early to try to prevent fraud by competitors and at the same time to commit fraud themselves.

Voters come into the polling station, show their identification, and are given an officially signed envelope. They go into one of the polling booths, where they pick the ballot of their preferred candidate and put it into the envelope before depositing it in a sealed box. Brokers use many underhanded tactics during elections to prevent people from voting for opposition candidates. One widespread trick is repeatedly to steal opposition ballots so that voters can only pick among the ones they see; 22 brokers admitted at some point in the interview to sending followers to vote at regular intervals and steal opposition ballots. In the legislative election of 2009, I saw personally

how brokers exchanged real opposition ballots for fakes. Opposition voters did not notice the difference, but the fake ballots had the wrong number printed on them and were later annulled. Brokers also told me that Peronist brokers supervising lists for different PJ candidates routinely shared among themselves votes for parties that did not have deputies at the polling stations. Besides faking ballots, brokers also stuff the ballot box, miscount votes, change the numbers after the official count, switch ballot boxes, and bribe election monitors.

Despite the difficulty of estimating the effects of fraud on electoral results, what is clear is that candidates without enough people to supervise each polling station are easy prey for fraud. In fact, the PJ is the only party able to dispatch party officials to each of the 22,000-plus polling stations in the CB and to supervise elections. According to a former interior minister from the Radical Party, this party is able to supervise only about 65 percent of the CB polling stations (Interior Minister 2012). An ex-governor of Buenos Aires told me, “Unless you have an army of brokers to supervise the election in the CB, you can be sure it will be stolen from you” (Governor 2, 2009).

Why do Brokers Multitask?

The evidence shows that brokers must manage many responsibilities at the same time. They are not just vote buyers but neighborhood embedded party agents performing multiple tasks to help their bosses to win elections and to govern. Table 2 summarizes all the roles brokers fulfill as presented in the previous two sections. By showing what the relevant actors get from each broker’s role, table 2 lets us appreciate that brokers are multifaceted agents contributing in different ways to party machines.

From table 2 an important theoretical question emerges: why do politicians build a network of multitasked brokers? Why do they not instead diversify roles among different brokers? One could think that governing, campaigning, and supervising elections each requires different sets of skills, and that therefore, politicians would resort to different brokers depending on the task. For example, they could have brokers who specialize in campaigning and brokers focused on vote buying. Furthermore, if they were to diversify roles in this way, inefficient brokers would perform only one role badly in their neighborhoods and not all of them. However, brokers' actions, as described in this study, show that this is not the case; politicians do not diversify roles, and brokers multitask. A broker is a municipal officer, campaign activist, vote buyer, and election supervisor all in one.

One broker illustrated well what mayors demand in terms of multitasking.

I am not very good at supervising elections; I prefer the streets. I was not a party official supervisor in last election. I do not like it. You have to be good at numbers and forms. Nevertheless, I am learning now; my boss told me I have to learn in order to do it at the next election whether I like it or not. (Broker 13, 2009)

Table 2

Similarly, a mayor confirmed that being a broker comes with multifold demands. "Brokers work much more than depicted by the press; they are on duty 24 hours a day. A good broker is always in the neighborhood doing whatever you need; painting graffiti, fixing streets, getting you information..." (Mayor 2, 2009). Brokers multitask because they need to be compendia of

neighborhood information to successfully perform any of their roles, and each role they perform reinforces their suitability to perform other roles.

Key characteristics of successful brokers are their permeation of every corner of their neighborhoods and their knowledge of people. While different brokers' roles require different skills, knowing their neighborhood is always a required expertise. It is a nondiversifiable asset and a necessary condition of any brokerage activity. A broker is, as Wang describes it for the case of the KMT in Taiwan, a "walking encyclopedia of local knowledge" (2007, 64). Brokers know about geographic and structural conditions in their areas and hold a record of neighbors' biographies, relationships, preferences, and needs. This knowledge is not developed overnight, but achieved and perfected through several years of walking up and down poor neighborhood streets and talking to people. It requires investing time and resources. For this reason, being a broker is a full-time job, and brokers' tenure is usually long.

Because it is a full-time job, politicians need to pay brokers a full salary. Good brokers do not come cheap, and developing a network of embedded brokers requires considerable investment. Politicians allocate temporary public jobs and social program benefits to brokers. Once the fixed cost of having full-time, knowledgeable, and embedded brokers is covered, politicians use them for every local task possible. Politicians exploit to the maximum this reservoir of local knowledge. After they have invested in a broker, they expect this broker not only to buy votes but also to perform any role that requires local knowledge and presence. Furthermore, by commending different roles to brokers, politicians maximize brokers' efficiency. Each role brokers perform reinforces their probabilities of successfully performing the other roles. A broker who provides public goods, for example, will have better chances to mobilize supporters.

It is, therefore, an optimal strategy for mayors and their challengers to exploit the local network of brokers in every realm of grassroots politics. In fact, the PJ's ability to develop a network of neighborhood political leaders permeating most poor areas and exploit it for political gain may be its most important feature and the most salient variable in explaining its persistent electoral hegemony. Brokers reach voters in almost every poor district.

The client's perspective: brokers as reliable neighbors

While monitoring and reciprocity may exist, they are not the main mechanisms that enforce voters' compliance with clientelistic deals. None of the brokers I interviewed thought it possible to check how an individual voted. Even brokers who admitted to cheating on election day denied this possibility. Although 22 brokers acknowledged that they stole other party ballots from the polling stations, and 12 even admitted to paying certain clients with illegal drugs, none of them reported monitoring individual votes. Furthermore, voters' and brokers' narratives show that we cannot disregard the rationality of the actors involved. It is not monitoring or reciprocity that assures voters' compliance but voters' preference for brokers with a reputation for accessing resources and fulfilling their promises.

From the client's perspective, not all brokers are the same; some brokers access resources and keep their promises, but others do not. In the poor neighborhoods of Argentina, people specifically distinguish between "plugged-in" brokers and the "smoke merchants." A "plugged-in" broker has political pull and connections, manages resources, and keeps his promises. A "smoke merchant" is simply a charlatan (Zarazaga 2013).

Voters demand two essential qualities from their brokers: access to resources and reliability, the latter being equally as important as the former. Brokers' reputation for accessing resources and delivering them is largely based on past performance (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, 8). Voters prefer to keep dealing with brokers who have fulfilled their promises, because past deliveries prove that those brokers are not smoke merchants. Once voters have seen that a broker can deliver, they will support that broker; they choose to do so because they know that they can rely on that broker to deliver more goods in the future (Zarazaga 2013). In the case of the poor, their brokers are the next-door neighbors who have been solving problems for them (Auyero 2001) and the most reliable source of solutions for future problems.

The fact that brokers and clients usually do not have single-shot relationships but long-lasting ones points to the self-sustaining nature of the vote-buying mechanism. A poor woman from a slum depicted it: “[The broker] does not give me everything that I want, but he got me school uniforms for my children and he always helps me out with food. If I go to somebody else I might well end up with less than that. He has my loyalty” (Victoria 2009). Evidence from brokers also confirms this dynamic. Brokers frequently highlighted the importance of delivering on their promises to gain the loyalty of their clients. As one broker declared, “if you do not fail them, they are happy to support you. I have people who come before the election asking for the ballot because they want to vote for my candidate. This is because I have been helping them for years and they know I will continue to do so” (Broker 11, 2009). This illustrates not only why clients fulfill their part of the deal—they want reliable brokers—but also why brokers do so, too: they need to deliver in order to keep the support of their clients and, thus, their positions.

Brokers and voters' interests are aligned. The flow of resources to voters is dependent on their brokers' electoral success. If the broker loses the election and is replaced, clients do not know

what the new broker will offer them. A new broker may access fewer resources or choose to distribute them to other people; brokers often remind voters about this. I witnessed firsthand, for example, how a broker, on the eve of Election Day 2009, gave a food handout to an elderly person while reminding her, “if we lose there might not be any more food handouts.” Oliveros (2012, 24) has shown that public employees fear they will lose their jobs if the incumbent loses. Clients who received their jobs through brokers prefer their brokers’ candidates to win. If their broker or the person ultimately responsible for getting them hired is not re-elected, their jobs will be in jeopardy (Auyero 2001, 123; O’Donnell 2005, 165).

It is in the voters’ own interest to vote as their brokers expect, especially considering that their brokers’ future depends on the electoral results not only at the municipal level but also at the most disaggregated level: the voting booth.¹⁰ Brokers’ futures do not depend only on their bosses’ overall electoral success but also on the results at each booth for which that broker is responsible. Voters with good brokers have strong incentives to keep their brokers; knowing that their brokers will keep their position as long as they are successful at the voting booth, voters will protect their own interest by voting for the brokers’ candidates.

Candidates monitor brokers’ success in each neighborhood and reward or punish individual brokers accordingly. An elected mayor would probably fire the brokers in charge of the polling stations where he lost. One broker working for a mayor realized, after losing the municipal legislative election of 2009, “Now many of us will be replaced. I lost in my zone, but not as badly as others did in their zones, so I might be able to keep my position” (Broker 11, 2009). Also, brokers who do badly may look for new clients in the polling stations where they performed worst.

On average, 3 people vote per household, and 350 people vote at each booth. Therefore, the average household represents nearly 1 percent of the votes at the average booth. Thus, if a family

decides not to support its broker and votes for another candidate, the gap between the two candidates at the booth where the family votes will change by almost 2 percent. If another family does the same, that gap will change by almost 4 percent. This could be the difference between winning and losing at that particular booth. Therefore, clients do not know whether or not they are pivotal at the booth level. In other words, clients are aware that they can help decide their brokers' fate. Given that clients do not want their broker to lose but know that their vote is so important, voters do not renege on their commitment to their brokers. A broker explained this mechanism very well:

The voter knows that if his broker does not perform well in the election at the neighborhood level, he will be replaced, even if his candidate wins as mayor. If that happens, [the voter] does not know how much he can get from the new broker. If the broker delivers, the voters stick with him. (Broker 12, 2009)

Conclusions

Brokers' relevance for politics at the ground level cannot be fully understood without comprehending all the roles and strategies they perform. Furthermore, we can only comprehend how clientelism actually works by taking account of the complete set of brokers' roles and the complex set of relationships they establish. This article has shown the full range of brokers' roles. It has highlighted the relevance for local politics of brokers' local knowledge and reputation acquired through different activities, explaining why brokers multitask and offering a new perspective on brokerage. With this new perspective on brokerage, this article also has offered an

answer to why voters support their brokers. It has shown that often, the poor prefer their brokers to win elections rather than to lose, because their brokers offer security about the future flow of goods and services. It is reasonable for the poor to support their brokers with their vote when they have learned from experience that their brokers are a reliable source of goods.

While PJ brokers build their reputation and credibility in poor areas by responding to voters' concerns, other parties often lack representation. As one slum dweller observed, "here opposition representatives are like Halley's Comet: they pass through very seldom and never for long. They are hard to see." This opens an interesting avenue for future research, as it may explain why other parties do not have their own networks of brokers. The PJ shifted during the 1990s from seeking the support of the lower classes through unions to courting their support with clientelistic appeals (Levitsky 2003). The PJ enjoyed a "first mover" advantage when poverty increased dramatically in the 1990s, and once its brokers developed the reputation for delivering among the poor, it became hard for any other party's brokers to compete.

Appendix: Data

The Conurbano Bonaerense consists mainly of poor industrial suburbs populated by the working class and the unemployed. The four selected municipalities are important electoral districts that display characteristics typical of this area. La Matanza alone, with 834,000 voters, has a larger electorate than 17 of the 24 Argentine provinces. The other three municipalities in this study (Merlo, 326,000; Malvinas Argentinas, 203,000; and San Miguel, 186,000 voters) have electorates equal to or bigger than those of provinces such as Formosa, Tierra del Fuego, and Santa Cruz. The four municipalities lie near the median of the CB in socioeconomic terms.

I personally conducted in-depth interviews with 120 brokers, 112 of whom were Peronist, from these municipalities. The interviews lasted an average of two hours and were conducted between June 2009 and December 2010. Although a random sample of brokers was logistically impossible, I was able to interview a large number of them with a low rate of refusal (8). The brokers were selected with a snowball technique. Since I had resided and worked in poor areas of Buenos Aires for 15 years, I was able to interview first the universe of brokers of a particular slum (7 brokers) that I knew well, and then asked them if they knew brokers similar to themselves in their own and in the other three municipalities.

I asked brokers about their geographic area of influence; with this information I was able to assemble maps locating brokers. For some areas and localities, especially in La Matanza, which is the CB's largest municipality, brokers did not provide me with any contacts. In these localities, I recruited new seeds of snowballing by asking people at schools (3), churches (8), and health centers (4) if they knew any brokers in their neighborhoods. In this way I was able to interview brokers from all major areas and localities.

The advantage of locating brokers in this way, as opposed to contacting them through their bosses, is that it avoids bias, as party leaders may introduce only those brokers who do not break the law. It also avoids the bias of interviewing only brokers who were electoral candidates, as these are usually more educated than the average broker.

Since I wanted to trace brokers' roles at different moments on the electoral calendar, I also engaged in participant observation and conducted follow-up interviews (from 3 to 5) with 12 brokers. Brokers enabled me to engage in participant observation by taking me in their buses to rallies, inviting me to political meetings, and allowing me to stay at their headquarters, even on

Election Day (June 28, 2009). Prolonged firsthand observation in the field allowed me to capture an entire movie, so to speak, of the clientelistic machine at work, rather than mere snapshots.

To confirm the political dynamics described by brokers, I also interviewed party leaders and executive officials, including 3 former governors of the Province of Buenos Aires, 5 CB mayors, and 12 municipal directors and secretaries. While this study focuses on the CB, the Peronist Party also appeals to the poor in the non- industrial provinces. Most of the main dynamics found in the urban Peronist machine in these four municipalities of the CB were confirmed for the provinces in interviews I carried out with 12 party leaders, 4 mayors, and 3 governors from other municipalities and provinces. I also interviewed 6 former ministers and 5 directors of different areas of welfare programs at the national level. In other words, nothing leads us to suspect that the main dynamics found in the CB are not generalizable.

List of Interview Questions

1. Do you get temporary municipal jobs and/or workfare programs for your people?
2. Did you bring any public goods in the last four years? Do you provide any service for the neighborhood?
3. Do you know the socioeconomic situation of each family you help?
4. What is your role during campaigns? Which tasks do you carry out?
5. Is it common practice that brokers give illegal drugs to their followers?
6. Which resources do you regularly distribute to help out your people?
7. Which are the fundamentals that enable you to do your political job?

Interviews

Unless noted, all interviews took place in the Province of Buenos Aires. Broker 1. 2009. August 16.

Broker 2. 2010. October 21.

Broker 3. 2010. December 11.

Broker 4. 2010. July 12.

Broker 5. 2010. October 10.

Broker 6. 2010. November 25.

Broker 7. 2009. August 16.

Broker 8. 2010. December 10.

Broker 9. 2009. August 2.

Broker 10. 2010. July 11.

Broker 11. 2009. July 14.

Broker 12. 2009. August 23.

Broker 13. 2009. October 7.

Governor 1. 2010. Former Governor of Buenos Aires Province. December 27.

Governor 2. 2009. Former Governor of Buenos Aires Province. August 17.

Interior Minister. 2012. Former National Interior Minister. Buenos Aires, July 26.

Luis. 2009. Slum dweller. La Matanza, August 3.

Mayor 1. 2009. July 13.

Mayor 2. 2009. July 13.

Mayor 3. 2010. August 9.

Oscar. 2010. Municipal Sub-Secretary of Government. Buenos Aires, December 16.

Victoria. 2009. Resident of San Miguel, Buenos Aires Province. August 22.

Table 1 – TMJ, CPs, and Election Results for Mayor in Four CB Municipalities

Municipality	TMJ	CP	Adults in households w/TMJs or CPs	Total Positive Votes	Total Votes for Winner 2011
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
La Matanza	7.000	18.000	75.000	648.178	392.535
Merlo	3.500	5.000	25.500	248.535	119.016
San Miguel	1.600	2.000	10.800	142.720	76.256
Malvinas Argentinas	3.000	3.500	19.500	170.337	93.569

Source: All data gathered by the author. The data for temporary municipal jobs were provided by each municipality. The data for people in cooperatives come from the National Ministry of Social Development. 2011.

Table 2 – Who gets What in Machine Politics?

Brokers' Roles	Clients	Brokers	Politicians
Governing			
Public goods provider	Public goods and services	Reputation Information Avoid liability	Agency
Mayor's facilitator	Access to the municipality	Executive power	Operative expertise Information Security
Getting Candidates Elected			
Propaganda activist	Info about candidates	Display territorial control Become known	Display territorial control Advertise
Rally mobilize	Money Food handouts	Display convening power Measure clients' loyalty	Display convening power Measure brokers' convening power
Vote buyer	Jobs / Workfares Handouts	Votes at their polling stations	Votes
Party polling official	-	Money	Supervision of

elections

Fraud in their
favor

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